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Treasury, perhaps? Might that narrow it too much in terms of one's
overall abilities as an executive to be President?
SENATOR GRIFFIN: Well, it is something to think about, but I
have heard this argument come up over and over again in the
confirmation proceedings of various Cabinet officials. Sometimes-I
think in the case of Carla Hills, for example-it was pointed out that
she didn't have enough experience and background in the housing
field. That argument was made, and it was answered that she didn't
have to be a specialist; if she was a good administrator, she could run
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, gathering under
her the various specialists.
So I don't think that is really a big problem. I think anybody who is
going to be capable of being Vice-President of the United States should
be capable of being Secretary of State, for example, to run almost any
of the departments of government.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES: ABOLITION, SUCCESSION
AND SPECIAL ELECTION

SENATOR BAYH:
I endorse wholeheartedly Arthur's idea of doing
away with the Vice-President as a functioning office indispensable to
the running of the government. Realistically, as has been said here, I
think there is only one role for the Vice-President, and that is not
presiding over the United States Senate. Bob, Margaret, and I can
attest, the Vice-President is not there very often and he does not often
make a great contribution when he is. The role is to serve as President;
we have an office, frankly, that we hope and pray to God we don't
have to utilize in its basic purpose: we hope the President doesn't die,
doesn't have to resign, isn't disabled, and unless that happens, then I
really don't think the Vice-President is essential.
So as I look at the responsibility of this Symposium directed to
change, I think we have to ask ourselves, first of all: does it help to
have a Vice-President when there is a need for succession? There I
think I differ with Arthur. I think there is, that it strengthens the role
of a succeeding individual to have served as Vice-President. As inept
as he may be, or however little character the jobs he has been given
may have had, our success has been remarkable, having VicePresidents who, before they were called on to meet the responsibility,
all the prophets would have said they would have fallen on their faces.
So the success ratio has not been insignificant.
I think what we have to do as we look at this is to accept the
premise that, all right, what can we do, if anything, to help the
Vice-President be better prepared in the event fate calls on him to
serve as President?
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Now, there are two things that I think make the Vice-President
better prepared to serve as President if he is called on to do so than
someone else, and that is why I support the existence of the VicePresidency, not that as an ongoing function it is indispensable. One is
that I think there is a greater acceptance of a Vice-President when he
succeeds to the Presidency than if it is the Speaker of the House or a
President pro tein. Second, we have seen a trend where the VicePresident is exposed to more of the operations of the Presidency so he
is perhaps a bit more prepared.
MR. YOUNG: I would like to speak also on the question of abolishing the office altogether. Senator Bayh mentioned that we have had a
good number of transitions that have proved successful. The Arthur
example, going back to that again, was quite successful in that he
became a reformer and reversed political attitudes toward the spoils
system. Also, retention of the Vice-President means that we are almost
certain to retain the four-year electoral mandate. In 1972 we had a
landslide in a vote for President of the United States, President Nixon
winning by 18 million votes. Yet two years later had we not had a
Vice-President in place, we had the dire possibility of seeing the
executive branch of the government pass into the hands of the
opposition party, and I think we need to preserve the four-year
electoral system and the four-year mandate.
An alternative would be to have some sort of caretaker sit in,
perhaps the Speaker of the House, perhaps the Secretary of State, for a
brief period while we had a special election. But I don't think we
should have a man who is regarded as a "caretaker" in the White
House.
Secondly, I don't think we should have any sort of special election
imposed upon a system that is already overcrowded with many
primaries, with the two conventions, with the protracted campaign
that runs on for several months. I think the election schedule is already
filled, and I think it takes too much time, too much energy, too many
resources, and I would oppose any system that contemplates introducing any special election to fill the office of the President of the United
States.
Furthermore, I don't think it is realistic to expect that Congress is
going to consider another Constitutional amendment soon. This is an
enormous ordeal. I have read Mr. Bayh's book, 20 Mr. Feerick's book.
This was a tremendous struggle, to find the right language for the
various clauses of the twenty-fifth amendment. This indicates, in my
mind at least, that Congress probably is not going to have any stomach
for any further Constitutional amendment of the electoral system.
20.

B. Bayh, One Heartbeat Away (1968).
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For these reasons essentially, I would favor the present processwith some minor revisions in the nominating process for VicePresident-and retention of the office of Vice-President.
PROF. SCHLESINGER:
I think I am pleased that the panel has not
indulged so far in the illusion that the Vice-Presidential office can be
transformed into a serious working office making daily contributions to
the running of government. As I say, we have had 41 Vice-Presidents.
None of them has ever been given a serious job.
For the reasons that George Reedy suggested, I have tried to suggest
I do not think a Vice-President will ever be given any serious job by a
President. This means that the argument for the Vice-Presidency, for
retention of the office, gets down, as far as I can see, to two points,
both made very persuasively by Senator Bayh, and they are: first, the
problem of succession; and second, the futility of trying to produce any
sort of radical change.
Birch, I think you are probably right, at this stage, about the
present unlikelihood of radical change. Yet, you have to start somewhere. You started from nowhere, in your various and successful
efforts to amend the Constitution. I think that the only way any
constructive change is ever going to be brought about is if it makes
sense and if people begin to discuss it, and if it wins the backing of
eminent committees and eminent people, and so on, so that it enters
the blood stream, so to speak, and maybe some time, maybe not in this
generation but some time in the future, something will happen. So I
don't think the fact of the temporary or the contemporary futility of a
suggestion should necessarily mean that we should not consider it and
try to do a little pioneering.
I think I would sa that not only can the office of the Vice-President
not be transformed into anything of any seriousness, but that it is a
positively damaging office for those who hold it. It does not prepare
people for the Presidency in any effective way. Presidents generally
exclude Vice-Presidents from the most serious problems. It is simply a
historical fact. Presidents do not even like to see the Vice-Presidents
around, no matter how friendly they may have been before the
inauguration day, because Vice-Presidents are a constant reminder of
their own mortality, and Presidents know and Vice-Presidents know
that the only job is to wait for the President to die. This is not the basis
for an enduring friendship. And that is why Vice-Presidents spend so
much of their time in foreign travel, why they spend so much time at
state funerals in Jakarta and Helsinki; anything to get them out of
town.
I think it is a humiliating, frustrating and in many cases a deeply
demoralizing experience, and I think people are often better prepared
for the job without being Vice-President. I think Hubert Humphrey
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would have made a better President in 1964 than in 1968 precisely
because he would have been spared that experience. I think of what
Bill Moyers said about Harry Truman, that he was lucky he was only
Vice-President for three months; if he had been Vice-President for
three years, he wouldn't have been as effective a President.
I think all that should be taken into consideration. It is not an
effective school training ground for the Presidency, nor is it the only
way to solve the question of succession.
I would remind you of what happened in France a few years ago
when President Pompidou died. The French constitution provided for
a special election to be held within 35 days. A special election was
held. France elected Giscard d'Estaing. There was a curious contrast
between the great American democracy, which by this time had an
appointed President and soon an appointed Vice-President-you had
the two top officials, neither of whom had been produced by the
electoral process, neither had been voted for by anybody in the country
for the offices they held-as against the system in France, where the
death of the President was followed by an orderly process of presidential choice.
Oddly enough, the French system is the system that was first
contemplated in the Constitutional Convention. The idea was that we
should have a President pro tern in case of vacancy in the Presidential
office and that this should be followed by what Madison called an
intermediate election to choose a new President. The office of the
Vice-Presidency came into the picture, as you all will remember, only
in the last fortnight of the Constitutional Convention, not to deal with
the succession problem but to deal with a different problem, and that
was the problem of making sure that there would be a "national"
President. Under the Electoral College, at a time when loyalty ran to
states rather than the national government, it was supposed that each
state would vote for a favorite son. By compelling each state to cast its
votes for two candidates, one of whom had to live outside the state, it
was thought possible to overcome local loyalties and, out of this, to
produce someone who would command national support, and it was
decided to make the man who came in first President and the man who
came in second Vice-President, and that, as Hugh Williamson of the
drafting committee explained to the Constitutional Convention, such
an office as Vice-President was "not wanted"; it was introduced only
for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be
chosen at the same time.
The concept of the special election was embodied specifically in the
Presidential Succession Act of 1792.21 It was embodied by implication
21.

Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9, 10, 1 Stat. 239.
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in the Presidential Succession Act of 1886.22 And it was proposed oy
Harry Truman in 1945 when he was contending for passage of a new
Succession Act, though it was deleted by Congress in the course of the
passage of that Act in 1946.23
It would seem to me that if you believe in self-government, the
logical way to do it is the way it was originally contemplated by the
Founding Fathers, the way that it is conducted in France today, and
that is, in the case of a vacancy in the Presidential office, I believe you
have to have an acting President provided for, followed by a new
election, as in the French constitution.
In our case, I don't think an acting President should come from
Congress, because I believe that the importance of policy continuity is
very great.
Therefore, I think the Secretary of State, if constitutionally
qualified-or if not, returning to the Succession Act of 1886, other
appointees, descending through the Cabinet-should serve as Acting
President for a period of 35 days as in France or, say, 60 days, and
then you have an election.
There is complaint that we have too many elections. Surely we do,
but for the President of the United States, on the rare occasion that
this contingency will come, certainly the principle of self-government is
worth a little discomfort, and perhaps we can learn through this
process the way to make our elections more compact and not protract
them in this painful way we have come to do in recent years.
Elections, it is said, are divisive. One has to balance risks. There are
those who say that elections in wartime are divisive. But we had
wartime elections in 1864 and 1944. The country survived. I think that
it may well be that the process of election may resolve confusions and
produce a more abiding unity than the appointment or succession to
the Presidency of a man not specifically chosen for that office by the
people.
So I do urge first, the notion of a return to the original system of an
application to American circumstances, a system that works so well
and efficiently in France, not to be excluded. It is the one approach to
the process that will result in putting in the White House an elected
President to fill out the term, as we often elect people to the House and
the Senate to fill out a term. This will establish the Presidency on the
basis of democratic choice, which is a proper principle, and it will be
consistent with that principle of the Constitution requiring the President to be elected.
I think that this deserves consideration because it rests firmly on
22. Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1. For discussion of the 1792 and 1886 Acts see J.
Feerick, From Failing Hands 57-62, 140-46 (1965).

23.

3 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
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democratic principles. The only way we may ever get, it seems to me,
to the only reasonable solution of this problem is through talking about
it as early and as often as possible.
MR. KiRBo: I think maybe some of us misconceive the present
process.
I see no reason why the President shouldn't be allowed to select his
running mate as is being done. I think perhaps Mr. Schlesinger
misconceived the process to the extent that under the present process
he apparently assumes that the Vice-President is elected for on-the-job
training. But under the present process, certainly the one Mr. Carter
used, Senator Mondale was selected on the basis that he was now
prepared to serve as the President. I think that is what the process
contemplated, not that he was being held out as someone that could
get some additional training and perhaps he would qualify as President. That was the first and foremost question that was asked about
each man being considered: Is he able now to assume the Presidency?
I also question the conclusion that the man cannot learn, cannot
equip and prepare himself while he is Vice-President, regardless of the
duties that the President gives him. Certainly no one would say that all
of the Vice-Presidents degenerated while they were in office. Certainly,
Mr. Truman was a man that studied, reflected, observed and prepared
himself. And when he became President, he made a good President.
I don't agree that if you are not given the authority to run HEW or
to run some other branch of government, that you degenerate during a
period of time when you have the opportunity to observe the government closely, certainly a better opportunity than you have any other
way. So I think in that respect that the system has been misconceived.
Also, one of the main duties of the President, the greatest test he will
have, is in appointments. Under the process, he selects the heads of the
judicial system. In fact, he appoints the judicial system in the form of
the Supreme Court and the various judges. He appoints the Cabinet
members who carry out the functions of the government. So people are
entitled to know in the very beginning what sort of judgment does he
have, what sort of people will he select, and when he selects a
Vice-President, if he uses poor judgment, they have some indication of
his judgment, and they have a right to reject it.
So I think that the process in that respect is good. It has got some
deficiencies in it. But any process that I have seen has also got defects.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: If I could go back to a little bit of the discussion
that Professor Schlesinger and Mr. Young were having, I was interested in Mr. Young's point of the danger of introducing a new
election into an already overcrowded system. I sooner think that
sometimes democratic reforms can have very undemocratic outcomes.
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Aside from some of the objections that have been raised to special
elections in terms of the question of stability, one of the proposals has
been to have a special election within 90 days if the vacancy occurred
in the last year or before the last year of the Presidential term-and I
wonder whether, if you have a vacancy toward the end of the term,
whether you are not going to cause great complications in the whole
system of primaries. You could have a case where a special election
took place in, say, February or March, right at the same time when
you have people gearing up to run in the primaries. It seems to me the
outcome of this would be to prevent a Governor Carter or a McGovern
or a John Kennedy from becoming Presidential candidates in some
cases. But what it would tend to do would be to make the Presidential
candidates people who would be likely to be acceptable to the political
leaders and also who would tend to be Congressional leaders. This is
one of the reasons for the French system. The analogy may not be
entirely good, because in France, presidents do tend to come from
Parliament and people who are national political leaders and there isn't
this whole primary attitude which, I believe, allows a neutral attitude
to surface.
The other question is how you would work it into the transition
period, and I suspect in many cases you might find that the acting
President would subsequently be elected, given the fact that VicePresidents who succeed tend to be very popular at the beginning. But
suppose he wasn't elected. Suppose you had the candidate from a
different party who was elected. It would seem to me one of the
problems you would have would be: would he take over immediately?
Right now President-elect Carter has this eleven-week period in which
to choose new personnel. If you had somebody emerge after a special
election from a different party, he would have to put together a
government, I would think, in a rather short period of time.
The third point I would like to raise-and perhaps it is a very
remote possibility and an unimportant one, but I guess as we have
seen in the last few years, things that have been thought to be remote
possibilities have a way of coming true-how would the special
election system handle the case of Presidential inability?
I know, Professor Schlesinger, you have written that inability really
isn't a very major concern, but I wonder whether you would have a
special election or not in a case of Presidential inability.
PROF. SCHLESINGER:
I didn't go into the detail of it, but I would
not favor a special election in the last year of a President's four-year
term. I would have the acting President serve out the last year of the
term.
As to the question of interregnum, I think it is too long as it is. I
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think, again, there are limitations to the European examples. In
France, the French constitution provides the maximum length of the
interregnum as 35 days. In England, the Prime Minister moves out one
day and the new man moves in the next. There are differences,
because the American President has a greater number of appointments
to make. The civil service extends much farther upward in France and
England. But I do believe that the problems of interregnum, as I have
both studied them and experienced them, are not so imposing as to
require the amount of time the present Constitution allots to them. I
think it is a problem, but I don't think we have to have an interregnum as long as the one currently provided for in the Constitution. As
for Presidential inability, if it is total inability, you have a new
election. If it is a passing inability, of the kind discussed in the
amendment, I would have the Secretary of State-if constitutionally
qualified-play the role of the Vice-President under the amendment.
SENATOR GRIFFIN:

I think it could be emphasized that a very

important advantage, fall-out, benefit of the suggestion of a special
election would be that we would have to hold it in a short period. You
alluded to that. I think if there is one reform that we could use that the
electorate would certainly welcome, it would be some way of shortening the campaign. Our process has gotten long and tortuous. It is an
especially difficult period for an incumbent President to be involved
over such a long period of time in the process *of becoming nominated.
Although I don't put Arthur's reform proposal at the top of my list, I
certainly think that aspect of it could well be emphasized.
SENATOR BAYH: [With respect to the weaknesses of delay and
uncertainty in the present system,] our primary order of business in the
first period of this next session is going to be to try to move a piece of
legislation that has had great popular support, concerning the Electoral College. The weakness and the need for reform were made
evident by the recent election. We have gone through an election
where we came within 10,000 votes, really, of electing a President who
had fewer popular votes than the man he ran against. In 1968, just
two elections away, we came within 71,000 votes of giving a fellow by
the name of George Wallace the ability to use his 36 electors to bargain
off the Presidency.
Senator Griffin has been one of those who has been helping us in this
regard. I am hopeful that we will be able to make some progress. It is
a nonpartisan effort that has been supported by the Bar Association,
the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, the AFLCIO, and the United Auto Workers. Eighty percent of the people told
George Gallup they are for this kind of thing, and we are going to
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move in this direction, and I hope before I am through I can convince
my good friend, Clarence Mitchell ....

I don't think anybody, Carter,

Ford, Democrat or Republican, would really relish the role2 4of the
Presidency if he were not the popular choice of the people.
SENATOR GRIFFIN:
. . . I want to emphasize that Birch Bayh's
twenty-fifth amendment is really a great and fine piece of work. It has
worked exceedingly well in two situations already.
I might just say that I am a member of the Senate Rules Committee
and sat in on the confirmation hearings on the nomination of Mr. Ford
and Mr. Rockefeller, so I have been a very close participant in that
operation, and I really think that rather than having the Speaker of the
House, who isn't selected by the people but only selected by one house
of the Congress, be in line for the succession, and rather than having a
Cabinet officer who is only selected by the President and confirmed by
one house of the Congress, it makes a lot of sense to follow the
procedure that has been established.
VOICE: I would like to ask Professor Schlesinger for a little enlargement on his proposal, which I am not too familiar with. I would
particularly like to know who would be the acting President and how
long would the campaign be in a special election, and what his
thoughts were on how the parties would select their candidates to run
in that special election, whether they would have a convention as they
do now.
PROF. SCHLESINGER:
I believe that the President should be drawn
from the executive branch in order to preserve the continuity of policy
which was mandated when the voters spoke at the previous general
election. And, therefore, the notion under the Succession Act of 1946
of bringing the Speaker of the House or the President pro tem of the
Senate in seems to me a mistake; and the principle in the Succession
Act of 1886 of descending through the Cabinet seems to me the proper
principle as to the Presidency.
As to the length of the campaign, that would be a matter of
judgment. It would seem to me 60 or 90 days would be adequate.
I am very glad that Bob Griffin agrees that our political campaigns
have gotten out of control because I think it is keenly felt among the
electorate that anything that might mean less time and less money and
less agony would be helpful, both for the special election and possibly
for subsequent general elections.
As for the mode by which Presidential candidates can be chosen,
24. S.J. Res. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see Weaver, Move Is Begun in Senate to Replace
Electoral College With Direct Vote, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1977, at A10, col. 4; Commission on
Electoral College Reform, American Bar Association, Electing the President (1967).
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again there are a variety of ways. The simplest and shortest would be
to do it through the National Committees, which as a result of new
party rules are much more representative bodies than they have been
in the past. But I think probably the better way would be in a new
national convention.
SENATOR BAYH:
Can I make one observation?
You and I have had a chance to discuss this at length on the public
record, which nobody has bothered to read, and I don't blame them. It
was not what you might call good bedtime reading.
But I think it is important, if we are going to go the Schlesinger
route, to understand really where we are headed in all of its consequences. Because to compare the French system and English system
and the ability of England and France to respond on a short-term basis
I think has to take into consideration the different political system, the
parliamentary political system, in which leaders who run in the next
election are already well known, the platforms are pretty well staked
out, and so it is easy to do in a short-term frame of reference.
Although I think we can make some significant changes in the
primary process and we can shorten it and make it less expensive, it
seems to me if we shorten that period and lay that time frame on at
least recent history, we will have no nominees by the name of
Goldwater, we will have no nominees by the name of McGovern, or
by the name of Ford, or by the name of Carter. Because one of the
things about our political process, with all of its shortcomings, is that it
lets a fellow who happens to be a peanut farmer from Georgia or a
senator from a sparsely populated state like Arizona, if he is willing to
spend the time and take his case and what he believes philosophically
to the people of the country, have a chance to be President of the
United States. I don't want to take away that opportunity. I would like
to knock off some of the rough edges, and I hope we can do that, but I
don't know how a candidate can build his case in a special-election
time frame, and I feel very strongly about that. I think it is important
to recognize what the consequences are.
PROF. SCHLESINGER: I think those are cogent points. I think it is a
balance of. disadvantages. In the first place, special elections are not
going to happen all that often. In the second place, they will fill out an
unexpired term. Further, it would not interfere with the regular
primary process. I wholly agree with what Birch Bayh says about the
value of the primary system. It would be reinstated in full form by the
time of the next quadrennial election.
There are disadvantages. It seems to me they are less weighty
disadvantages than those in the present system.
MR. KIRBo: Let me say one thing on this question of special

